On analyzing and evaluating privacy measures for social networks under
  active attack by DasGupta, Bhaskar et al.
On analyzing and evaluating privacy measures for
social networks under active attack
Bhaskar DasGuptaa,1,∗, Nasim Mobasheria,1, Ismael G. Yerob,2
aDepartment of Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL 60607,
USA
bDepartamento de Matema´ticas, Escuela Polite´cnica Superior, Universidad de Ca´diz, 11202
Algeciras, Spain
Abstract
Widespread usage of complex interconnected social networks such as Facebook,
Twitter and LinkedIn in modern internet era has also unfortunately opened the
door for privacy violation of users of such networks by malicious entities. In
this article we investigate, both theoretically and empirically, privacy violation
measures of large networks under active attacks that was recently introduced
in (Information Sciences, 328, 403–417, 2016). Our theoretical result indicates
that the network manager responsible for prevention of privacy violation must be
very careful in designing the network if its topology does not contain a cycle. Our
empirical results shed light on privacy violation properties of eight real social
networks as well as a large number of synthetic networks generated by both the
classical Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model and the scale-free random networks generated by
the Bara´basi-Albert preferential-attachment model.
Keywords: Privacy measure, social networks, active attack, empirical
evaluation
2010 MSC: 68Q25, 68W25, 05C85
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: bdasgup@uic.edu (Bhaskar DasGupta), nmobas2@uic.edu (Nasim
Mobasheri), ismael.gonzalez@uca.es (Ismael G. Yero)
1Research partially supported by NSF grant IIS-1160995.
2This research was done while the author was visiting the University of Illinois at Chicago,
USA, supported by “Ministerio de Educacio´n, Cultura y Deporte”, Spain, under the “Jose´
Castillejo” program for young researchers (reference number: CAS15/00007)
Preprint submitted to Information Sciences September 18, 2018
ar
X
iv
:1
80
9.
05
92
6v
1 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 16
 Se
p 2
01
8
1. Introduction
Due to a significant growth of applications of graph-theoretic methods to
the field of social sciences in recent days, it is by now a standard practice to
use the concepts and terminologies of network science to those social networks
that focus on interconnections between people. However, social networks in gen-
eral may represent much more than just networks of interconnections between
people. Rapid evolution of popular social networks such as Facebook, Twitter
and LinkedIn have rendered modern society heavily dependent on such virtual
platforms for their day-to-day operation. The powers and implications of social
network analysis are indeed indisputable; for example, such analysis may un-
cover previously unknown knowledge on community-based involvements, media
usages and individual engagements. However, all these benefits are not neces-
sarily cost-free since a malicious individual could compromise privacy of users
of these social networks for harmful purposes that may result in the disclosure
of sensitive data (attributes) that may be linked to its users, such as node de-
grees, inter-node distances or network connectivity. A natural way to avoid this
consists of an “anonymization process” of the relevant social network in ques-
tion. However, since such anonymization processes may not always succeed,
an important research goal is to be able to quantify and measure how much
privacy a given social network can achieve. Towards this goal, the recent work
in [43] aimed at evaluating the resistance of a social network against active
privacy-violating attacks by introducing and studying theoretically a new and
meaningful privacy measure for social networks. This privacy measure arises
from the concept of the so-called k-metric antidimension of graphs that we ex-
plain next.
Given a connected simple graph G = (V,E), and an ordered sequence of
nodes S = (v1, . . . , vt), the metric representation of a node u that is not in S
with respect to S is the vector (of t components) du,−S = (distu,v1 , . . . ,distu,vt),
where distu,v represents the length of a shortest path between nodes u and v.
The set S is then a k-antiresolving set if k is the largest positive integer such
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that for every node v not in S there also exist at least other k − 1 different
nodes vj1 , . . . , vjk−1 not in S such that v, vj1 , . . . , vjk−1 have the same metric
representation with respect to S (i.e., dv,−S = dvj1 ,−S = · · · = dvjk−1 ,−S).
The k-metric antidimension of G is defined to be value of the minimum cardi-
nality among all the k-antiresolving sets of G [43]. If a set of attacker nodes
S represents a k-antiresolving set in a graph G, then an adversary controlling
the nodes in S cannot uniquely re-identify other nodes in the network (based
on the metric representation) with probability higher than 1/k. However, given
that S is unknown, any privacy measure for a social network should quantify
over all possible subsets S of nodes. In this sense, a social network G meets
(k, `)-anonymity with respect to active attacks to its privacy if k is the smallest
positive integer such that the k-metric antidimension of G is no more than `. In
this definition of (k, `)-anonymity the parameter k is used for a privacy thresh-
old, while the parameter ` represents an upper bound on the expected number
of attacker nodes in the network. Since attacker nodes are in general difficult
to inject without being detected, the value ` could be estimated based on some
statistical analysis of other known networks. A simple example that explains
the role of k and ` to readers is as follows. Consider a complete network Kn on
n nodes in which every node is connected with every other node. It is readily
seen that for any 0 < ` < n, this network meets (n − `, `)-anonymity. In other
words, this means that a social network Kn guarantees that a user cannot be
re-identified (based on the metric representation) with a probability higher than
1/(n− `) by an adversary controlling at most ` attacker nodes. For other re-
lated concepts for metric dimension of graphs, the reader may consult references
such as [14, 25, 30].
Chatterjee et al. in [9] (see also [49]) formalized and analyzed the compu-
tational complexities of several optimization problems motivated by the (k, `)-
anonymity of a network as described in [43]. In this article, we consider three
of these optimization problems from [9], namely Problems 1–3 as defined in
Section 2. A high-level itemized overview of the contribution of this article
is as follows (see Section 3 for precise technical statements and details of all
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contributions):
. Our theoretical result concerning the anonymity issues for networks with-
out cycles is provided in Theorem 1 in Section 3.1. Some consequences of
this theorem are also discussed immediately following a statement of the
theorem.
. In Section 3.2, we first describe briefly efficient implementations of the
high-level algorithms of Chatterjee et al. [9] for Problems 1–3 (namely
Algorithms I and II in Section 3.2.1). We then tabulate and discuss the
results of applying these implemented algorithms for the following type of
network data:
. eight real social networks listed in Table 3 in Section 3.4.2,
. the classical undirected Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random networks G(n, p) for
four suitable combinations of n and p, and
. the scale-free random networks G(n, q) generated by the Bara´basi-
Albert preferential-attachment model for four suitable combinations
of n and q.
The 6 tables that provide tabulations of the empirical results are Tables 4–
9 in Section 3.2 and the type of conclusions that one can draw from these
tables are stated in the 11 conclusions numbered ¬– 11 in the same
section. Despite our best efforts, we do not know of any other alternate
approaches (e.g., sybil attack framework) that will provide a significantly
simpler theoretical framework to reach all the 11 conclusions as mentioned
above.
As an illustration of a potential application, consider the hub fingerprint query
model of Hey et al. [26]. Noting that the largest hub fingerprint for a target
node u is the metric representation of u with respect to the hub nodes, results
on (k, `)-anonymity are directly applicable to this setting of Hey et al. [26] that
models an adversary trying to identify the hub nodes in a network. For example,
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assuming that the quantity kopt in Problem 1 (see Section 2 for a definition) is
10, the network is vulnerable with respect to hub identification in the model of
Hey et al. in the sense that it is not possible to guarantee that an adversary will
not be able to uniquely re-identify any node in the network with probability at
most 0.1.
1.1. Some remarks regarding the model and our contribution (to avoid possible
confusion)
To avoid any possible misgivings or confusions regarding the technical con-
tent of the paper as well as to help the reader towards understanding the remain-
ing content of this article, we believe the following comments and explanations
may be relevant.
I The computational complexity investigations in this paper has nothing to
do with the model in the paper by Backstrom et al. [5]. We whole-heartedly
and without any reservations agree that the paper by Backstrom et al. [5] is
seminal, but the research investigations in this paper has nothing to do with
the model or any measure introduced in the paper by Backstrom et al. [5].
The notion of active attack is very different in that paper, and therefore
the computational problems that arise in that paper are very different from
those in the current paper and in fact incomparable. Finally, the goal of this
paper is not to compare various network privacy models but to investigate,
theoretically and empirically, the model in [43].
I This paper does not introduce any new privacy model or measure, but simply
investigates, both theoretically and empirically, computational problems for
a model that is published in “Information Sciences, 328, 403–417, 2016” (ref-
erence [43]). There have been several other subsequent papers investigating
this privacy measure, e.g., see [9, 44, 49, 34]. Thus, researchers in network
privacy are certainly interested in this model or related computational com-
plexity questions. Of course, this does not contradict the fact that the paper
by Backstrom et al. [5] is seminal.
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I Even though the network privacy model was introduced in [43] and therefore
the best option for clarification of any confusion regarding the model would
be to look at that paper, we provide the following clarification just in case.
In this model, nobody is trying to prevent adversaries. Informally, the pri-
vacy measure only gives a “measure” on how much secure a graph is against
active attacks, i.e., a probability with which we can assert that, if there are
controlled nodes in a graph, then we can in some sense know which is the
probability to be reidentified in such graph (for details please see the texts
preceding and following the statements of Problems 1–3 in Section 2). No
new nodes are added at all. This is not a problem that involves dynamic
graphs. The model in [43] is not the same as the one by Backstrom et al. [5].
1.2. Comparison with other existing works
Model comparison Unfortunately, different models of network privacy have
quite different objectives and consequently quite different measures that cannot
in general be compared to one another. In particular, we know of no other differ-
ent but comparable model or measure of network privacy that can be compared
to those in our paper. For example, the network privacy model introduced by
Backstrom et al. [5] is interesting, but the notion of active attack is very different
in that paper, and therefore the computational problems that arise in that paper
are very different from those in the current paper and in fact incomparable.
Algorithmic comparison Note that algorithms for different models cannot
be compared in terms of their worst-case (or average-case) computational com-
plexities. For example, consider the scale-free network model and the computa-
tional complexity paper for this model in [21]. Now, consider the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
random regular network model, and consider the paper in [51]. Even though [51]
provides better algorithmic results in terms of time-complexity and approxima-
bility, that does not nullify the research results in [21].
Privacy preservation in learning theoretic framework The recent surge
in popularity of machine learning applications to different domains, specifically
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in the context of deep learning methods, has motivated many Internet companies
to provide numerous online cloud-based services and frameworks for developing
and deploying machine learning applications (Machine Learning as a Service or
MLaaS) such as the Google Cloud ML Engine. Typically, an user (customer) of
such a system first estimates the parameters of a suitable model by training the
model with data and afterwards, once the correct model is determined, uploads
the model to the cloud provider such that remote users can use the model.
This type of service frameworks lead to two possible privacy concerns, the first
concerning privacy violations of the training data, and the second concerning
privacy violations of data uploaded by remote users. For some recent papers
dealing with possible remedies of these privacy violations, such as introducing
suitable random noises to perturb the data, see papers such as [40, 50]. However,
these privacy concerns are quite different from the current topic of our paper,
such as they are not specific to networks and they involve learning paradigms
which are not of interest to this paper. Whether privacy questions in the MLaaS
framework can be combined with those in this paper is an interesting research
question but unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper.
2. Basic notations, relevant background and problem formulations
Let G = (V,E) be the undirected input network over n nodes v1, . . . , vn.
The authors in [9] formalized and analyzed the computational complexities of
several optimization problems motivated by the (k, `)-anonymity of a network
as described in [43]. The notations and terminologies from [9] relevant for this
paper are as follows (see Fig 1 for an illustration)3:
I dvi = (distvi,v1 ,distvi,v2 , . . . ,distvi,vn) denotes the metric representation of a
node vi. For example, in Fig 1, dv1 = (0, 1, 3, 2, 3, 2).
3The notations and the theoretical frameworks are actually not that complicated once one
goes over them carefully. Although one may wonder if significantly simpler notations could
have been adopted without neglecting the complexities of the frameworks, it does not seem
to be possible in spite of our best efforts for over an year.
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v6v5v4v3v2v1
n = 6
distvi,vj values
G = (V,E)
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6
v1 0 1 3 2 3 2
v2 1 0 2 1 2 1
v3 3 2 0 1 1 3
v4 2 1 1 0 1 2
v5 3 2 1 1 0 3
v6 2 1 3 2 3 0
Figure 1: An example for illustration of some basic definitions and notations in Section 2.
I Nbr (v`) = { vj | {v`, vj} ∈ E } is the (open) neighborhood of node v` in G =
(V,E). For example, in Fig 1, Nbr (v2) = { v1, v4, v6 }.
I For a subset of nodes V ′ = {vj1 , vj2 , . . . , vjt} ⊂ V with j1 < j2 < · · · < jt
and any other node vi ∈ V \V ′, dvi,−V ′ =
(
distvi,vj1 ,distvi,vj2 , . . . ,distvi,vjt
)
denotes the metric representation of vi with respect to V
′. The notation
is further generalized by defining DV ′′,−V ′ = {dvi,−V ′ | vi ∈ V ′′ } for any
V ′′ ⊆ V \ V ′. For example, in Fig 1, dv3,−{v1,v5,v6} =
(
3
v1
, 1
v5
, 3
v6
)
and
D{v2,v3},−{v1,v5,v6} =
{
(
from v2︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
v1
, 2
v5
, 1
v6
), (
from v3︷ ︸︸ ︷
3
v1
, 1
v5
, 3
v6
)
}
.
I A partition Π′ = {V ′1 , V ′2 , . . . , V ′` } of S′ ⊆ V is called a refinement of a
partition Π = {V1, V2, . . . , Vk} of S ⊇ S′, denoted by Π′ ≺r Π, provided Π′
can be obtained from Π in the following manner:
. For every node vi ∈
(∪kt=1Vt) \ (∪`t=1V ′t ), remove vi from the set in Π that
contains it.
. Optionally, for every set V` in Π, replace V` by a partition of V`.
. Remove empty sets, if any.
For example, for Fig 1, {{v2}, {v3}, {v4, v5}} ≺r {{v1, v2, v3}, {v4, v5}}.
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I The following notations pertain to the equality relation (an equivalence rela-
tion) over the set of (same length) vectors DV \V ′,−V ′ for some ∅ ⊂ V ′ ⊂ V :
. The set of equivalence classes, which forms a partition of DV \V ′,−V ′ , is
denoted by Π=V \V ′,−V ′ . For example, in Fig 1, D{v2,v3,v4,v5},−{v1,v6} ={
(
from v2︷︸︸︷
1
v1
, 1
v6
), (
from v3︷︸︸︷
3
v1
, 3
v6
), (
from v4︷︸︸︷
2
v1
, 2
v6
), (
from v5︷︸︸︷
3
v1
, 3
v6
)
}
and
Π={v2,v3,v4,v5},−{v1,v6} =
{{
(
from v2︷︸︸︷
1
v1
, 1
v6
)
}
,
{
(
from v4︷︸︸︷
2
v1
, 2
v6
)
}
,
{
(
from v3︷︸︸︷
3
v1
, 3
v6
), (
from v5︷︸︸︷
3
v1
, 3
v6
)
}}
.
. Abusing terminologies slightly, two nodes vi, vj ∈ V \ V ′ will be said to
belong to the same equivalence class if dvi,−V ′ and dvj ,−V ′ belong to the
same equivalence class in Π=V \V ′,−V ′ , and thus Π
=
V \V ′,−V ′ also defines a
partition into equivalence classes of V \ V ′. For example, in Fig 1, v3
and v5 belong to the same equivalence class in Π
=
{v2,v3,v4,v5},−{v1,v6} and
Π={v2,v3,v4,v5},−{v1,v6} also defines the partition
{{v2}, {v4}, {v3, v5}}.
. The measure of the equivalence relation is defined as µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′) def=
minY∈Π=
V \V ′,−V ′
{ | Y |}. Thus, if a set S is a k-antiresolving set, then
DV \S,−S defines a partition into equivalence classes whose measure is k.
For example, in Fig 1, µ
(
Π={v2,v3,v4,v5},−{v1,v6}
)
= 1.
By using the terminologies mentioned above, the following three optimization
problems were formalized and studied in [9]. We need to stress that one really
needs to study the three different problems and consequently the three objectives
(namely, kopt, L
≥k
opt and L
=k
opt) separately because they are motivated by different
considerations as explained before and after the problem definitions and as stated
in (?), (./) and (♠). Informally and briefly, Problem 1 and kopt are used to
provide an absolute privacy violation bound assuming the attacker can control
as many nodes as it needs, restricting the number of attacker nodes employed
by the adversary leads to Problem 2, and Problem 3 is motivated by a type of
trade-off question between (k, `)-anonymity vs. (k′, `′)-anonymity. Thus, it is
simply not possible to combine them into fewer than three problems.
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Problem 1 (metric anti-dimension or Adim)). Find a subset of nodes V ′
such that kopt = µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′) = max∅⊂S⊂V {µ (DV \S,−S) }.
A solution of Problem 1 asserts the following:
(?) Assuming that there is no restriction on the number of nodes
that can be controlled by an adversary, the following statements
hold:
(a) The network administrator cannot guarantee that an ad-
versary will not be able to uniquely re-identify any node
in the network (based on the metric representation) with
probability 1/kopt or less.
(b) It is possible for an adversary to uniquely re-identify kopt
nodes in the network (based on the metric representation)
with probability 1/kopt.
Thus, informally, Problem 1 and kopt give an absolute privacy violation
bound assuming the attacker can control as many nodes as it needs. In practice,
however, the number of attacker nodes employed by the adversary may be
restricted. This leads us to Problem 2.
Problem 2 (k≥-metric anti-dimension or Adim≥k). Given a positive inte-
ger k, find a subset V ≥kopt of nodes of minimum cardinality L
≥k
opt =
∣∣V ≥kopt ∣∣, if one
such subset at all exists, such that µ
(D
V \V ≥kopt ,−V ≥kopt
) ≥ k.
Similar to (?), a solution of Problem 2 (if it exists) asserts the following:
(./) Assuming that an adversary may control up to α nodes, the
following statements hold:
(a) If α < L≥kopt then the network administrator can guarantee
that an adversary will not be able to uniquely re-identify
any node in the network (based on the metric representa-
tion) with probability 1/k or less.
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(b) If α ≥ L≥kopt then the network administrator cannot guar-
antee that an adversary will not be able to uniquely re-
identify any node in the network (based on the metric rep-
resentation) with probability 1/k or less.
(c) If α ≥ L≥kopt then it is possible for an adversary to uniquely
re-identify a subset of β nodes in the network (based on the
metric representation) with probability 1/β for some β ≥ k
(note that β may be much larger compared to k).
The remaining third problem is motivated by the following trade-off question
between (k, `)-anonymity vs. (k′, `′)-anonymity: if k′ > k but `′ < ` then
(k′, `′)-anonymity has smaller privacy violation probability 1/k′ < 1/k compared
to (k, `)-anonymity but can only tolerate attack on fewer `′ < ` number of
nodes.
Problem 3 (k=-metric antidimension or Adim=k). Given a positive inte-
ger k, find a subset V =kopt of nodes of minimum cardinality L
=k
opt =
∣∣V =kopt ∣∣, if one
such subset at all exists, such that µ
(DV \V =kopt ,−V =kopt ) = k.
One can describe assertions to a solution of Problem 2 (if it exists) in a
manner similar to that in (?) and (./). Chatterjee et al. in [9] studied the
computational complexity aspects of Problems 1–3. They provided efficient
(polynomial-time) algorithms to solve Problems 1 and 2 and showed that Prob-
lem 3 is provably computationally hard for exact solution but admits an efficient
approximation for the particular case of k = 1 (see Algorithm II). Since we use
this approximation algorithm for k = 1, we explicitly state below the implica-
tion of a solution of Adim=1 (note that a solution of Adim=1 always exists and
L=1opt is trivially at most n− 1):
(♠) It suffices for an adversary to control a suitable subset of L=1opt
nodes in the network to uniquely re-identify at least one node in
the network (based on the metric representation) with absolute
certainty (i.e., with a probability of one).
11
3. Our theoretical and empirical results
3.1. Theoretical result
Suppose that a given graph G is a “k′-metric antidimensional” graph, i.e., k′
is the largest positive integer such that G has at least one k′-antiresolving set.
Then obviously G does not contain any k′′-antiresolving set for every k′′ > k′.
In contrast, it is not a priori clear if G contains k-metric antiresolving sets for
any k < k′. For instance, a complete graph Kn on n nodes is (n − 1)-metric
antidimensional and moreover, for every 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, there exists a set of
nodes in Kn which is a k-antiresolving set. Au contraire, if we consider the
wheel graph W1,n (see Fig 2 for an illustration for n = 16), it is easy to see
that the central node vn is the unique n-antiresolving set, 1-antiresolving and
2-antiresolving sets exist, 3-antiresolving sets also exist (if n is larger than 5),
but no k-antiresolving set exists for 4 ≤ k ≤ n−1. This motivates the following
research question:
For a given class of k′-metric antidimensional networks, can we de-
cide if they also have k-antiresolving sets for all 1 ≤ k ≤ k′ − 1?
v0
v1
v2
v3v4
v5
v6
v7
v8
v9
v10 v11
v12
v13
v14
v15v16
Figure 2: The wheel graph W1,n for n = 16.
The following theorem answers the question affirmatively for all networks
without a cycle.
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Theorem 1. If T is a k′-metric antidimensional tree, then for every 1 ≤ k ≤ k′
there exists a k-antiresolving set for T .
Some consequences of Theorem 1
Some consequences of the above result in relation to the (k, `)-anonymity
measure are as follows. Note that what is stated below is not the same as the
observations in [34].
Clearly, since trees have nodes of degree one (called leaves), it is always
possible to identify at least one node of the tree [34]. However, if the network
manager introduces some “fake” nodes as leaves, then this advantage for the
adversary is avoided. In this sense, the result above asserts that an adversary
will never be sure that the set of nodes which it could control will always identify
at least one node of the given tree. Another related interesting observation is
that for this to happen, the tree must be k-metric antidimensional for some
k ≥ 2, otherwise the tree is completely insecure. A characterization of that trees
which are 1-metric antidimensional (graphs that contain only 1-antiresolving
sets) was given in [44].
Note that in the above we claim nothing about what happens if the network
does contain a cycle, or how a network manager can break cycles in a network.
Note that the topology need not be “fully” controlled by a network manager,
but can be influenced by adding extra nodes.
Proof of Theorem 1
We will use the following result from [44] in our proof.
Lemma 2.[44] Any k-antiresolving set S in a tree T with k ≥ 2 induces a
connected subgraph of T .
Since Problem 1 was shown to be solvable in polynomial time in [9], we
may assume that we know the value k′ for which the tree T is k′-metric an-
tidimensional. If k = 1 or k = k′ then a k-antiresolving set for T clearly
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exists. We may also assume k > 1, since otherwise our result follows triv-
ially. Suppose that k = k′ − 1 and let S be a k′-antiresolving set of mini-
mum cardinality for T . By Lemma 2, S induces a connected subgraph of T .
Moreover, according to the definition of a k-antiresolving set, there exists an
equivalence class Q ∈ Π=V \S,−S such that |Q| = k′. Select v ∈ S such that
Nbr(v) \ S 6= ∅ and let v1, v2, . . . , vr ∈ Nbr(v) \ S for some r ≥ 1. Clearly, the
set A1 = {v1, v2, . . . , vr} forms an equivalence class of Π=V \S,−S . Moreover, the
set A2 =
⋃r
i=1 Nbr(vi) \ {v}, if not empty, also forms an equivalence class of
Π=V \S,−S . Fig 3 shows two examples which are useful to clarify all the notations
of this proof (recall that the eccentricity of a node v is the maximum over the
set of distances between v to all other nodes in the graph).
v
v1 v2 v3 v4
S S
(I) (II)
v
v3 v4 v2 v1
v5A1
A2
A3
A1
A2
A3
Figure 3: Two auxiliary trees. Notice that eccentricity of v in the subtrees is three in both
cases. The set S is a 4-antiresolving set. The nodes of the subtree T2 are shown in bold in
both trees.
Assume that T is rooted at node v and, for every vi ∈ A1, let Ti be the
subtree of T with node set V (Ti) formed by v, vi, and the set of descendants
of vi. Let ei be the eccentricity of v in Ti for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Moreover, let Aj be
the subset of nodes x in
⋃ r
i=1 V (Ti) such that distv,x = j for every 1 ≤ j ≤
max{ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ r}. Observe that each Aj , with 1 ≤ j ≤ max{ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ r},
is an equivalence class of Π=V \S,−S and thus, |Aj | ≥ k′ since otherwise S is not a
k′-antiresolving set. Moreover, without loss of generality, we can assume there
exists a set Aq such that |Aq| = k′ (e.g., in Fig 3 the sets A1 and A4). If there is
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no such set, then we choose another node v′ of T for which this situation happen.
If there is no such node v′ at all, then the cardinality of every equivalence class
of Π=V \S,−S is strictly larger than k
′, which contradicts the definition of a k′-
antiresolving set. We now consider the following situations.
Case 1: e1 = e2 = · · · = er (e.g., in Fig 3 (I) all the eccentricities are equal to 3).
Notice that in this case Aj ∩ V (Ti) 6= ∅ for every 1 ≤ j ≤ max{ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ r}
and every 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Moreover, there exist α, β such that |Aα ∩ V (Tβ)| = 1
(e.g., in Fig 3 (I) α = 1 and β can take any value between 1 and 4). Thus, for
the set S′ = S ∪ V (Tβ) it follows that Aα \ V (Tβ) is an equivalence class of the
equivalence relation Π=V \S′,−S′ and |Aα − V (Tβ)| = k′ − 1. Moreover, for every
other equivalence class X of Π=V \S′,−S′ it follows |X| ≥ k′ − 1 = k. Thus, X is
a (k′ − 1)-antiresolving set. Clearly, X could not be of minimum cardinality.
Case 2: There are at least two subtrees Ti and Tj such that ei 6= ej .
Without loss of generality, assume that e1 ≤ e2 ≤ · · · ≤ er. As in Case 1, there
exist γ such that |Aγ | = k′ (e.g., in Fig 3 (II) α = 3). Let S1 = S ∪ V (T1)
(note that T1 is the subtree in which v has the minimum eccentricity). If
|A(1)j | ≥ k′ for every A(1)j = Aj \ V (T1) with 1 ≤ j ≤ e1, then γ > e1 and
thus S1 is also a k
′-antiresolving set. Hence, we consider S2 = S1 ∪ V (T2)
(note that T2 is the subtree in which v has the second minimum eccentricity).
If |A(2)j | ≥ k′ for every A(2)j = A(1)j \ V (T2) with 1 ≤ j ≤ e2, then γ > e2.
Repeating this procedure, we shall find a set Sq = Sq−1 ∪ V (Tq) such that
γ ≤ eq and moreover, |Aα′ ∩ V (Tβ′)| = 1 for some 1 ≤ α′ ≤ er and q ≤ β′ ≤ r.
Thus, the set A
(q+1)
j = A
(q)
j \ V (Tq+1) satisfies |A(q)j | = k′ − 1 and consequently
Sq+1 = Sq∪V (Tq+1) is a (k′−1)-antiresolving set (e.g., in Fig 3 (II) the process
must be done two times, first we remove the nodes in the set V (T1) \ {v} and
next we remove the nodes in the set V (T2) \ {v}, thereby getting the required
(k′ − 1)-antiresolving set).
Thus, in both cases we obtain a (k′ − 1)-antiresolving set. By using the
same procedure and a (k′− 1)-antiresolving set of minimum cardinality, we can
find a (k′ − 2)-antiresolving set and in general a k-antiresolving set for every
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2 ≤ k ≤ k′ − 1, which completes the proof.
3.2. Empirical results
We remind the readers about the assertions in (?), (./) and (♠) while we
report our empirical results and related conclusions.
3.2.1. Algorithms for Problems 1–3 (Algorithms I and II)
We obtain an exact solution for Problem 2 by implementing the following
algorithm (Algorithm I) devised in [9] by Chatterjee et al.. In this algorithm,
an absence of a valid solution is indicated by L≥kopt ←∞ and V ≥kopt ← ∅.
(* Algorithm I *)
1. Compute dvi for all i = 1, . . . , n using any algorithm that solves
all-pairs-shortest-path problem [12].
2. L̂≥kopt ←∞ ; V̂ ≥kopt ← ∅
3. for each vi ∈ V do
3.1 V ′ = {vi} ; done← FALSE
3.2 while
(
(V \ V ′ 6= ∅) AND (NOT done) ) do
3.2.1 compute µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′)
3.2.2 if
( (
µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′) ≥ k ) and ( |V ′| < L̂≥kopt ) )
3.2.3 then L̂≥kopt ← |V ′| ; V̂ ≥kopt ← V ′ ; done← TRUE
3.2.4 else let V1, V2, . . . , V` be the only ` > 0 equivalence classes
in Π=V \V ′,−V ′ such that
|V1| = · · · = |V`| = µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′)
3.2.5 V ′ ← V ′ ∪ (∪`t=1Vt)
4. return L̂≥kopt and V̂
≥k
opt as our solution
We obtain exact solutions for Problem 1 and find kopt by using Algorithm I
and doing a binary search for the parameter k over the range {1, 2, . . . , n} to
find the largest k such that V ≥kopt 6= ∅. This requires using Algorithm I O(log n)
times.
16
Although Adim=k is NP-hard for almost all k, for k = 1 we implement the
following logarithmic-approximation algorithm devised in [9] by Chatterjee et
al. for Adim=1 computing L=1opt and V
=1
opt .
(* Algorithm II *)
1. Compute dvi for all i = 1, . . . , n using any algorithm that solves
all-pairs-shortest-path problem [12].
2. L̂=1opt ←∞ ; V̂ =1opt ← ∅
3. for each node vi ∈ V do
3.1 create the following instance of the set-cover problem [28]
containing n− 1 elements and n− 1 sets:
U = { avj | vj ∈ V \ {vi}},
Svj =
{
avj
} ∪ {av` |distvi,vj 6= distv`,vj} for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i}
3.2 if ∪j∈{1,...,n}\{i}Svj = U then
3.2.1 run the algorithm of Johnson in [28] for this instance of
set-cover giving a solution I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} \ {i}
3.2.2 V ′ = { vj | j ∈ I }
3.2.3 if
( |V ′| < L̂=1opt ) then L̂=1opt ← |V ′| ; V̂ =1opt ← V ′
4. return L̂=1opt and V̂ =1opt as our solution
3.3. Run-time analyses and implementations of Algorithms I and II
Both Algorithm I and Algorithm II use the all-pairs-shortest-path (Apsp)
computation, and this is the step that dominates the theoretical worst-case
running time of both the algorithms. The following algorithmic approaches are
possible for the all-pairs-shortest-path step:
• For the classical Floyd-Warshall algorithm for Apsp [12], the theoretical
worst-case running time of is O(n3) when n is the number of nodes in the
network. In practice, for larger networks the running time of the Floyd-
Warshall algorithm for Apsp can often be improved by using algorithmic
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engineering tricks such as early termination criteria that are known in the
algorithms community.
For our networks, we found the Floyd-Warshall algorithm with appropriate
data structures and algorithmic engineering techniques to be sufficient;
one reason for this could be that most of our networks, like many other
real-world networks, have a small diameter and thus some computational
steps in the Floyd-Warshall algorithm can often be skipped (the diameter
of a network can be computed in worst-case o(n3) time [47] and in just
O(m) time in practice for many real-world networks [13]).
• Repeatedly running breadth-first-search [12] from each node gives a solu-
tion of Apsp with a worst-case running time of O(mn), which is better
than O(n3) if m = o(n2), i.e., the network is sparse.
• For specific types of networks, practitioners also consider using other algo-
rithmic approaches, such as repeated use of Dijkstra’s single-source short-
est path or Johnson’s algorithm [12], if they are run faster. Both these
algorithms have a worst-case running time of O(n2 log n + nm) where m
is the number of edges, and therefore run faster than Floyd-Warshall al-
gorithm in the worst case if m = o(n2).
• Using graph compression techniques, it is possible to design a O(n3/ log n)
worst-case time algorithm for Apsp [16].
• Using fast matrix multiplication algorithms, Apsp can be solved inO(n2.376)
time [19, 20, 41] using Coppersmith and Winograd’s matrix multiplication
result [11].
For increasing the efficiency and speed of the algorithms we used various data
structures such as STL nested maps and vectors to improve comparisons and
lookup operations. Furthermore, for Algorithm I, we prematurely terminate
the algorithm if |Vopt| reaches 1 as 1 is the smallest value of the size of attacker
nodes.
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Finally, just like the measures in this article, the Apsp computation is un-
avoidable for a large variety of other geodesic-based network properties that are
often used for real networks such as the betweenness centrality, closeness cen-
trality or Gromov-hyperbolicity measure, and there is a vast amount of literature
that apply such measures to large networks (e.g., see [7, 46, 3, 35, 36, 27]).
3.4. Scalability of the privacy measure with respect to the size of network
We have tested computation of the privacy measures for graphs up to 1000
nodes. For Algorithm I, we found that the running time for computing the
measure for an individual network ranges from 1 minute or less (for smaller
sparser networks) to about 10 to 20 minutes (for larger denser networks). For
Algorithm-II the running time was mostly in the order of a few minutes.
However, for much larger networks than what has been used in this paper, we
would recommend a more careful implementation, specially for Algorithm I, to
achieve a more time efficient implementation. Towards this goal, we provide the
following suggestions in relation to computing the measures for larger networks:
• For larger networks, it would be advisable to use the fastest possible imple-
mentation of the all-pairs-shortest-paths algorithm. This is a well-known
problem that admits a variety of algorithms some of which are especially
more efficient on non-dense networks and moreover in practice the run-
ning times of many of these algorithms can be significantly improved by
using several algorithmic engineering tricks (early termination criteria,
efficient data structures etc.) that are known in the algorithmic imple-
mentation community. Also, if the same network is used for more than
one privacy measure computation, it is certainly advisable to store the
all-pairs-shortest-path data and re-use them instead of computing them
afresh every time.
• Although our simulation did not need it, for larger networks the relevant
set operations needed in Algorithms I and II can be implemented more
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efficiently, for example using the well-known data structures for disjoint
sets (e.g., see [18] for a survey).
• For extremely large networks, say dense networks containing millions of
nodes, it may be advisable to use a suitable sampling method such as
in [31] to sample appropriate sub-graphs of smaller size, and use the mea-
sures computed on these sub-graphs to statistically estimate the value of
the measures on the entire graph.
3.4.1. Synthetic networks: models and algorithmic generations
Unfortunately, there is no single universally agreed upon synthetic network
model that faithfully reproduces all networks in various application domains
(e.g., see [42, 29, 1]). In fact, there are some results that cast doubt if a true
generative network model can even be known unambiguously. Thus, it is very
customary in the network research community to draw conclusions of the fol-
lowing type:
“For those real-world networks generated by such-and-such model,
we can conclude that . . . . . .”
We use two major types of synthetic networks, namely the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random
networks and the scale-free random networks generated by the Bara´basi-Albert
preferential-attachment model [6]. Although the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network model
has been used by prior network researchers as a real-network model in several
application domains (e.g., see [39, 17, 33, 8]) it is also known that this particular
model is probably not very good a model for real networks in many other ap-
plication domains. Thus, we also consider networks generated by the scale-free
random network model which is more widely considered to be a real-network
model in many network applications (e.g., see [6, 4, 10, 45, 2]).
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model This is the classical undirected Erdo¨s-Re´nyi modelG(n, p),
where n is the number of nodes and every possible edge in the network is se-
lected independently with a probability of p. The average degree of any node
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in G(n, p) is (n − 1)p ≈ np, leading to n(n−1)p2 ≈ n
2p
2 as the average number
of edges in the network. Our privacy measures assume that the given graph
is connected since one connected component has no influence on the privacy
of another connected component. Thus, it is imperative to select only those
combinations of n and p that keeps the graph connected by keeping the aver-
age degree of every node to be at least 1. However, we actually need to make
sure that the average degree is at least 2 since, for example, L=1opt is trivially
equal to 1 otherwise. This implies that at the very least we must ensure that
(n − 1)p ≥ 2, or roughly np ≥ 2. However, in practice, while generating the
actual random networks one may need to select a p that is slightly higher (in
our case, np ≥ 2.5). Note that the giant-component formation in ER networks
happens around np ≈ 1, so we are indeed further away from this phenomenon
where slight variations in p cause abrupt changes in topological behavior of the
network. We used the following four combinations of n and p to generate our
synthetic networks to capture a smaller average degree of 2.5, a modest average
degree of 5 and a larger average degree of 10:
n = 500
p = 0.005
np = 2.5
n = 500
p = 0.01
np = 5
n = 1000
p = 0.005
np = 5
n = 1000
p = 0.01
np = 10
For n = 500 (respectively, for n = 1000) we generated 1000 random networks
(respectively, 100 random networks) for each corresponding value of p, and then
calculated relevant statistics using Algorithms I and II.
Scale-free model We use the Bara´basi-Albert preferential-attachment model
[6] to generate random scale-free networks. The algorithm for generating a
random scale-free G(n, q),where n is number of nodes and q  n is the number
of connections each new node makes, is as follows:
• Initialize G to have q nodes and no edges. Add these nodes to a “list of
repeated nodes”.
• Repeat the following steps till G has n nodes:
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– Randomly select q distinct nodes, say u1, . . . , uq, from the list of
repeated nodes.
– Add a new node w and undirected edges {w, u1}, . . . , {w, uq} in G.
– Add w and u1, . . . , uq to the current list of repeated nodes.
The larger the q is, the more dense is the network G(n, q). We used the following
four combinations of n and q to generate our synthetic scale-free networks:
n = 500
q = 5
n = 500
q = 10
n = 1000
q = 5
n = 1000
q = 10
For n = 500 (respectively, for n = 1000) we generated 1000 random networks
(respectively, 100 random networks) for each corresponding value of q, and then
calculated relevant statistics using Algorithms I and II.
3.4.2. Real networks
Table 3 shows the list of eight well-known unweighted social networks that
we investigated. All the networks except one were undirected; for the only
directed UC Irvine College Message platform network, we ignored the direction
of edges. For each network the largest connected component was selected and
tested.
3.4.3. Results for real networks in Table 3
Results for Adim and Adim≥k Table 4 shows the results forAdim via applying
Algorithm I to these networks. From these results we may conclude:
¬ For all networks except the “Enron Email Data” network, an at-
tacker needs to control only one suitable node of the network to
uniquely re-identify (based on the metric representation) a sig-
nificant percentage of nodes in the network (ranging from 2.6%
of nodes for the “University Rovira i Virgili emails” network to
26.5% of nodes for the “Zachary Karate Club” network).
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Table 3: List of real social networks studied in this paper.
Name # of Description
nodes edges
(A) Zachary Karate
Club [48]
34 78 Network of friendships between 34
members of a karate club at a US
university in the 1970s
(B) San Juan Commu-
nity [32]
75 144 Network for visiting relations be-
tween families living in farms in the
neighborhood San Juan Sur, Costa
Rica, 1948
(C) Jazz Musician Net-
work [22]
198 2842 A social network of Jazz musicians
(D) University Rovira i
Virgili emails [23]
1133 10903 the network of e-mail interchanges
between members of the University
Rovira i Virgili
(E) Enron Email Data
set [15]
1088 1767 Enron email network
(F) Email Eu core [37] 986 24989 Emails from a large European re-
search institution
(G) UC Irvine College
Message platform [38]
1896 59835 Messages on a Facebook-like plat-
form at UC-Irvine
(H) Hamsterster friend-
ships [24]
1788 12476 This Network contains friend-
ships between users of the website
hamsterster.com
­ For all networks except the “Enron Email Data” network, the
minimum privacy violation probability guarantee is significantly
further from zero (ranging from 0.019 for the “UC Irvine Col-
lege Message platform” network to 0.25 for the “Hamsterster
friendships” network). The minimum privacy violation prob-
ability guarantee for the “Hamsterster friendships” network is
significantly higher than all other networks.
® The “Zachary Karate Club” and the “San Juan Community”
networks are more vulnerable to privacy attacks in terms of
the percentage of nodes in the networks whose privacy can be
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violated by the adversary.
Table 4: Results for Adim using Algorithm I. n is the number of nodes and kopt is the largest
value of k such that V ≥kopt 6= ∅ (cf. Problem 1).
Name n kopt popt = 1/kopt L
≥kopt
opt = L
=kopt
opt
kopt
n
(A) Zachary Karate Club 34 9 0.111 1 26.5%
(B) San Juan Community 75 7 0.143 1 9.3%
(C) Jazz Musician Network 198 12 0.084 1 6.0%
(D) University Rovira i Virgili emails 1133 29 0.035 1 2.6%
(E) Enron Email Data set 1088 153 0.007 935 14.1%
(F) Email Eu core 986 39 0.026 1 3.4%
(G) UC Irvine College Message platform 1896 55 0.019 1 2.9%
(H) Hamsterster friendships 1788 4 0.25 1 0.22%
For the “Enron Email Data” network, L≥koptopt = 935 implies that even to
achieve a modest value of popt = 0.007 an adversary needs to control a large
percentage (at least 935×1001088 % ≈ 86%) of its nodes, a possibility unlikely to
happen in practice. Thus, we continue further investigation about this network
to check if a value of k somewhat smaller than kopt may allow a sufficiently steep
decline in the number of nodes that the attacker need to control, and report
the values of L≥kopt corresponding to relevant values of k > 1 in Table 5. As can
be seen, the values of L≥kopt does not decline unless k is really further away from
kopt, leading us to conclude the following:
¯ For the “Enron Email Data” network, privacy violation of a
large number of nodes of the network by an attacker cannot be
guaranteed in a practical sense (i.e., without gaining control of
a large number of nodes).
Results for Adim=1 Algorithm II returns L=1opt = 1 for all of our networks ex-
cept the “Hamsterster friendships” network. For the “Hamsterster friendships”
network, Algorithm II returns L=1opt = 2. Thus, we conclude:
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Table 5: Values of L≥kopt corresponding to values for k > 1 for “Enron Email Data” network.
Only those values of k > 1 for which L≥kopt 6= L≥k−1opt are shown.
(E) Enron Email Data set
k 4 5 10 20 40 60 100 120 153
pk = 1/k 0.25 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.025 0.017 0.01 0.009 0.007
L≥kopt 1 334 463 567 683 842 935 935 935
° For all the real networks except the “Hamsterster friendships”
network, an adversary controlling just one suitable node may
uniquely re-identify (based on the metric representation) one
other node in the network with certainty (i.e., with a probabil-
ity of 1). For the “Hamsterster friendships” network, the same
conclusion holds provided the adversary controls two suitable
nodes.
3.4.4. Results for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi synthetic networks
Results for Adim≥k Table 6 shows the results for Adim≥k via applying Algo-
rithm I to these networks. From these results we may conclude:
± For most synthetic Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks, kopt is a value that
is much smaller compared to the number of nodes n. Thus,
for our synthetic Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks, with high probability
privacy violation of a large number of nodes of the network by
an attacker cannot be achieved.
² The values of koptn for denser Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks (correspond-
ing to p = 0.01) is about 75% higher that those for sparser
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks (corresponding to p = 0.005) irrespec-
tive of the number of nodes. Thus, we conclude that our sparser
synthetic Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks are more privacy-secure com-
pared to their denser counter-parts.
Results for Adim=1 Table 7 shows the result of our experiments of computation
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Table 6: Results for Adim≥k using Algorithm I for classical Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model G(n, p). kopt
is the largest value of k such that V ≥kopt 6= ∅ (cf. Problem 1). The %-values indicate the
percentage of the generated networks for those particular values of kopt (e.g., for n = 500 and
p = 0.005, 980 out of the 1000 networks have kopt ≥ 5).
Network
parameters
n p
500 0.005
kopt ≥ 4 ≥ 5 ≥ 6 ≥ 7 ≥ 8 ≥ 9 ≥ 10 > 10
popt = 1/kopt ≤ 0.25 ≤ 0.2 ≤ 0.166 ≤ 0.142 ≤ 0.125 ≤ 0.111 ≤ 0.1 < 0.1
% of networks 100% 98% 81.8% 54.6% 21.5% 8% 3% 1%
At least 90% of networks have kopt ≤ 8 and koptn ≤ 0.016
500 0.010
kopt ≥ 9 ≥ 10 ≥ 11 ≥ 12 ≥ 13 ≥ 14 ≥ 15 > 15
popt = 1/kopt ≤ 0.11 ≤ 0.1 ≤ 0.09 ≤ 0.083 ≤ 0.077 ≤ 0.071 ≤ 0.066 < 0.066
% of networks 100% 98% 94% 81.4% 49.4% 21.4% 6.8% 0.6%
At least 90% of networks have kopt ≤ 14 and koptn ≤ 0.028
1000 0.005
kopt ≥ 10 ≥ 11 ≥ 12 ≥ 13 ≥ 14 > 14
popt = 1/kopt ≤ 0.1 ≤ 0.09 ≤ 0.083 ≤ 0.077 ≤ 0.071 < 0.066
% of networks 100% 99% 65% 16% 7% 1%
At least 90% of networks have kopt ≤ 13 and koptn ≤ 0.013
1000 0.010
kopt ≥ 18 ≥ 19 ≥ 20 ≥ 21 ≥ 22 ≥ 23 ≥ 24 > 24
popt = 1/kopt ≤ 0.055 ≤ 0.052 ≤ 0.05 ≤ 0.047 ≤ 0.045 ≤ 0.043 ≤ 0.041 < 0.041
% of networks 100% 99% 90% 75% 47% 26% 9% 1%
At least 90% of networks have kopt ≤ 23 and koptn ≤ 0.023
of L=1opt using Algorithm II. From these results, we conclude:
³ For our synthetic Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks, with high probability
an adversary controlling at most two nodes may uniquely re-
identify (based on the metric representation) at least one other
node in the network.
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Table 7: Results for Adim=1 using Algorithm II for classical Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model G(n, p). The
%-values indicate the percentage of the generated networks that have the corresponding value
of L=1opt (e.g., for n = 500 and p = 0.01, 920 out of the 1000 networks have L
=1
opt = 1).
Network parameters L=1opt
n p 1 2 > 2
500 0.01 92% 7% 1%
500 0.005 5.9% 89.3% 4.8%
1000 0.01 8% 90% 2%
1000 0.005 5% 93% 1%
3.4.5. Results for scale-free synthetic networks
Results for Adim≥k Table 8 shows the results for Adim≥k via applying Algo-
rithm I to these networks. From these results we may conclude:
´ The value of kopt relative to the size n of the network is much
larger for synthetic scale-free networks compared to those for
the synthetic Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks. Thus, compared to syn-
thetic Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks, synthetic scale-free networks may
allow privacy violation of a larger number of nodes of the net-
work by an attacker.
µ Unlike the synthetic Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks, the values of koptn
for denser scale-free networks (corresponding to q = 10) may
be smaller or larger than those for sparser scale-free networks
(corresponding to q = 5). Thus, density of scale-free networks
does not seem to be well-correlated to privacy-security of these
networks.
Results for Adim=1 Table 9 shows the result of our experiments of computation
of L=1opt using Algorithm II. From these results, we conclude:
11 Similar to synthetic synthetic Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks, for syn-
thetic scale-free networks also with high probability an adver-
sary controlling at most two nodes may uniquely re-identify
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Table 8: Results for Adim≥k using Algorithm I for the Bara´basi-Albert preferential-
attachment scale-free model G(n, q). kopt is the largest value of k such that V
≥k
opt 6= ∅ (cf.
Problem 1). The %-values indicate the percentage of the generated networks for those partic-
ular values of kopt (e.g., for n = 500 and q = 5, 990 out of the 1000 networks have kopt ≥ 50).
Network
parameters
n q
500 5
kopt ≥ 49 ≥ 50 ≥ 55 ≥ 60 ≥ 65 ≥ 70 > 70
popt = 1/kopt ≤ 0.0204 ≤ 0.02 ≤ 0.018 ≤ 0.016 ≤ 0.015 ≤ 0.014 < 0.014
% of networks 100% 99% 97% 89% 42% 10% 6%
At least 90% of networks have kopt ≤ 65 and koptn ≤ 0.13
500 10
kopt ≥ 45 ≥ 60 ≥ 80 ≥ 100 ≥ 120 ≥ 140 > 140
popt = 1/kopt ≤ 0.022 ≤ 0.016 ≤ 0.0125 ≤ 0.001 ≤ 0.008 ≤ 0.007 < 0.007
% of networks 100% 50% 48% 47% 27% 5% 4%
At least 95% of networks have kopt ≤ 120 and koptn ≤ 0.24
1000 5
kopt ≥ 88 ≥ 90 ≥ 100 ≥ 110 ≥ 120 ≥ 130 ≥ 135
popt = 1/kopt ≤ 0.011 ≤ 0.010 ≤ 0.001 ≤ 0.009 ≤ 0.008 ≤ 0.007 ≤ 0.0074
% of networks 100% 98% 94% 66% 32% 11% 1%
At least 89% of networks have kopt ≤ 120 and koptn ≤ 0.12
1000 10
kopt ≥ 86 ≥ 88 ≥ 90 ≥ 92 ≥ 94 ≥ 96 ≥ 98 > 100
popt = 1/kopt ≤ 0.0116 ≤ 0.0113 ≤ 0.0111 ≤ 0.0108 ≤ 0.0106 ≤ 0.0104 ≤ 0.0102 < 0.001
% of networks 100% 77% 67% 56% 43% 30% 13% 3%
At least 87% of networks have kopt ≤ 96 and koptn ≤ 0.096
(based on the metric representation) at least one other node in
the network.
4. Conclusion
Rapid evolution of popular social networks such as Facebook and Twitter
have rendered modern society heavily dependent on such virtual platforms for
their day-to-day operation. However, the many benefits accrued by such online
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Table 9: Results for Adim=1 using Algorithm II for the Bara´basi-Albert preferential-
attachment scale-free model G(n, q). The %-values indicate the percentage of the generated
networks that have the corresponding value of L=1opt (e.g., for n = 500 and q = 5, 990 out of
the 1000 networks have L=1opt = 2).
Network parameters L=1opt
n q 2 > 2
500 5 99% 1%
500 10 99.5% 0.5%
1000 5 99% 1%
1000 10 99% 1%
networked systems are not necessarily cost-free since a malicious entity may
compromise privacy of users of these social networks for harmful purposes that
may result in the disclosure of sensitive attributes of these networks. In this
article, we investigated, both theoretically and empirically, quantifications of
privacy violation measures of large networks under active attacks. Our theo-
retical result indicates that the network manager responsible for prevention of
privacy violation must be very careful in designing the network if its topology
does not contain a cycle, while our empirical results shed light on privacy vi-
olation properties of eight real social networks as well as synthetic networks
generated by the classical Erdo¨-Re`nyi model. We believe that our results will
stimulate much needed further research on quantifying and computing privacy
measures for networks.
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